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Abstract. Profile likelihood is the key tool for dealing with nuisance pa-
rameters in likelihood theory. It is often asserted, however, that profile
likelihood is not a ‘true’ likelihood. One implication is that likelihood
theory lacks the generality of e.g. Bayesian inference, wherein marginal-
ization is the universal tool for dealing with nuisance parameters. Here
we argue that profile likelihood has as much claim to being a true
likelihood as a marginal probability has to being a true probability dis-
tribution. The crucial point we argue is that a likelihood function is
naturally interpreted as a maxitive possibility measure: given this, the
associated theory of integration with respect to maxitive measures de-
livers profile likelihood as the direct analogue of marginal probability in
additive measure theory. Thus, given a background likelihood function,
we argue that profiling over the likelihood function is as natural (or
as unnatural, as the case may be) as marginalizing over a background
probability measure. The connections to Bayesian inference can also be
further clarified with the introduction of a suitable logarithmic distance
function, in which case the present theory can be naturally described
as ‘Tropical Bayes’ in the sense of tropical algebra.
Key words and phrases: Estimation, Inference, Profile Likelihood, Marginal-
ization, Nuisance Parameters, Idempotent Integration, Maxitive Mea-
sure Theory, Tropical Algebra, Tropical Bayes.
1. INTRODUCTION
Consider the opening sentence from the entry on profile likelihood in the En-
cyclopedia of Biostatistics (Aitkin, 2005):
The profile likelihood is not a likelihood, but a likelihood maximized over nuisance
parameters given the values of the parameters of interest.
Numerous similar assertions that profile likelihood is not a ‘true’ likelihood
may be found throughout the literature and various textbooks, and is apparently
the accepted viewpoint of the statistical community. Importantly, this includes
the ‘pure’ likelihood literature, which generally accepts a lack of systematic meth-
ods for dealing with nuisance parameters, while still recommending profile likeli-
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hood as the most general, albeit ‘ad-hoc’, solution (see e.g. Royall, 1997; Rohde,
2014; Edwards, 1992; Pawitan, 2001). Similarly, recent monographs on character-
izing statistical evidence presents favorable opinions of the likelihood approach
but criticize the lack of general methods for dealing with nuisance parameters
(Aitkin, 2010; Evans, 2015). The various justifications given, however, appear to
the present author to rather vague and unconvincing. For example, suppose we
modified the above quotation to refer to marginal probability instead of profile
likelihood:
A marginal probability is not a probability, but a probability distribution integrated
over nuisance variables given the values of the variables of interest.
The above would be a perfectly fine characterization of a marginal probability
if the “not a probability, but” part was dropped, i.e.
A marginal probability is a probability distribution integrated over nuisance vari-
ables given the values of the variables of interest.
Simply put: the fact that a marginal probability is obtained by integrating over
a ‘background’ probability distribution does not prevent the marginal probability
from being a true probability. The crucial observation in the case of marginal
probability is that integration over variables takes probability distributions to
probability distributions.
The purpose of the present article is to point out that there is an appropri-
ate notion of integration over variables that takes likelihood functions to like-
lihood functions via maximization. This notion of integration is based on the
idea of idempotent analysis, wherein one replaces a standard algebraic opera-
tion such as addition in a given mathematical theory with another basic alge-
braic operation, defining a form of ‘idempotent addition’, to obtain a new anal-
ogous, self-consistent theory (Maslov, 1992; Kolokoltsov and Maslov, 1997). In
this case one simply replaces the usual ‘addition’ operations, including the usual
(Lebesgue) integration, with ‘maximization’ operations, including taking supre-
mums, to obtain a new, ‘idempotent probability theory’. Maximization in this
context is understood algebraically as an idempotent addition operation, hence
the terminology. While perhaps somewhat exotic at first sight, this idea finds
direct applications in e.g. large deviation theory (Puhalskii, 2001) and, most rel-
evantly, possibility theory, fuzzy set theory and pure-likelihood-based decision
theory (Dubois, Moral and Prade, 1997; Cattaneo, 2013, 2017). A popular spe-
cial instance of idempotent mathematics is so-called ‘tropical mathematics’ in
which multiplication is also converted to a new algebraic operation, here addition
(see e.g. Speyer and Sturmfels, 2009; Akian, Quadrat and Viot, 1996; Litvinov,
2007; Pachter and Sturmfels, 2004; Bernhard, 2000). That is, the basic ‘addition’
and ‘multiplication’ operations in tropical algebra are interpreted as (max,+),
respectively, instead of the usual (+,×). With the introduction of a logarithmic
distance in likelihood theory, multiplication of likelihoods becomes addition of
log-likelihoods and we are naturally led to a ‘Tropical Bayesian’ interpretation of
(log) profile likelihoods. This provides a formal foundation for the usual intuitive
interpretation of (negative) log-likelihoods as ‘cost’ measures.
The present argument is not, of course, without objections. In particular,
acceptance or rejection of the present interpretation depends on what one be-
lieves the key properties of likelihood should be; this is, perhaps surprisingly,
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not without significant controversy (Bayarri and DeGroot, 1992; Bjørnstad, 1996;
Bayarri, DeGroot and Kadane, 1988). Thus we end with a discussion of various
potential objections, including a discussion of some properties one might want
a general notion of ‘likelihood’ to satisfy and whether the present interpretation
does or does not satisfy these. Despite potential conflicts with some frequentist,
evidential and/or Bayesian considerations, we believe that the present interpre-
tation is a clear, self-consistent and suitable foundational concept for ‘pure’ like-
lihood theory (particularly that developed by Edwards, 1992), and/or for what
we propose to call ‘Tropical Bayes’.
2. LIKELIHOOD AS A POSSIBILITY MEASURE
Though apparently not well known in the statistical literature, likelihood the-
ory is known in the wider literature on uncertainty quantification to have a
natural correspondence to possibility theory rather than to probability theory
(Dubois, Moral and Prade, 1997; Cattaneo, 2013, 2017). This has perhaps been
obscured by the usefulness of likelihood methods as tools in probabilistic statisti-
cal inference. It is not our intention to review this wider literature in detail here
(see e.g. Dubois, Moral and Prade, 1997; Cattaneo, 2013, 2017; Augustin et al.,
2014; Halpern, 2017, for more), but to simply point out the implications of this
correspondence. In particular, likelihood theory interpreted as a possibilistic,
rather than probabilistic theory can be summarized as:
Probability theory with addition replaced by maximization.
As indicated above, this is sometimes known as, for example, ‘idempotent mea-
sure theory’, ‘maxitive measure theory or ‘possibility’ theory, among other names
(see e.g. Dubois, Moral and Prade, 1997; Cattaneo, 2013, 2017; Augustin et al.,
2014; Halpern, 2017; Maslov, 1992; Kolokoltsov and Maslov, 1997; Puhalskii,
2001, for more). This correspondence perhaps explains the preponderance of
maximization methods in likelihood theory, including the methods of maximum
likelihood and profile likelihood.
The most important consequence of this perspective is that the usual Lebesgue
integration with respect to an additive measure, as in probability theory, be-
comes, in likelihood/possibility theory, a different type of integration, defined
with respect to a maxitive measure. Again, the key point is simply that addition
operations (including summation and integration) are replaced by maximization
operations (or taking supremums in general).
For completeness, we contrast the key axioms of possibility theory with those
of probability theory. Given a set of possibilities of Ω, assumed to be discrete for
the moment for simplicity, and for two discrete sets of possibilities A,B ⊆ Ω the
key axioms of elementary possibility theory are (Halpern, 2017):
(2.1)
poss(∅) = 0
poss(Ω) = 1
poss(A ∪B) = max{poss(A),poss(B)}
which can be contrasted with those of elementary probability theory:
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(2.2)
prob(∅) = 0
prob(Ω) = 1
prob(A ∪B) = sum{prob(A),prob(B)}
where A and B are required to be disjoint in the probabilistic case, but this is
not strictly required in the possibilistic case.
Given a ‘background’ or ‘starting’ likelihood measure, likelihood theory can be
developed as a self-contained theory of possibility, where derived distributions are
manipulated according to the first set of axioms above. This is entirely analogous
to developing probability theory from a background measure, with derived dis-
tributions manipulated according to the second set of axioms. As our intention is
to consider methods for obtaining derived distributions by ‘eliminating’ nuisance
parameters, we need not consider here where the starting measure comes from
(but see the Discussion).
To make the correspondences of interest clear in what follows, we first present
probabilistic marginalization as a special case of a pushforward measure or, equiv-
alently, as a special case of a general (not necessarily 1-1) change of variables. We
then consider the possibilistic analogues.
3. PUSHFORWARD PROBABILITY MEASURES AND THE DELTA
FUNCTION METHOD FOR GENERAL CHANGES OF VARIABLE
Given a probability measure µ over a random variable x ∈ Rn with associated
density ρ, define the new random variable t = T (x) where T : Rn → Rm. This
variable is distributed according to the pushforward measure T ⋆µ, i.e. t ∼ T ⋆µ.
The density of t, here denoted by q = T ⋆ ρ, is conveniently calculated via
the delta function method which is valid for arbitrary changes of variables (not
necessarily 1-1):
(3.1) q(t) = [T ⋆ ρ](t) =
∫
δ(t − T (x))ρ(x)dx.
As a side point, we note that this method of carrying out arbitrary transforma-
tions of variables is standard in statistical physics (see e.g. Van Kampen, 1992),
but is apparently less common in statistics (see the articles Au and Tam, 1999;
Khuri, 2004, aimed at highlighting this method to the statistical community).
3.1 Marginalization via the delta function method
The above means that we can interpret marginalization to a component x1,
say, as a special case of a (non-1-1) deterministic change of variables via:
(3.2) ρ(x1) =
∫
δ(x1 − projX1(x))ρ(x)dx,
where projX1(x) is simply the projection of x to its first coordinate. Thus
marginalization can be thought of as the pushforward under the projection op-
erator and as a special case of a general (not necessarily 1-1) change of variables
t = T (x).
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4. PROFILE LIKELIHOOD AS MARGINAL POSSIBILITY AND AN
EXTENSION TO GENERAL CHANGES OF VARIABLE
As we have repeatedly stressed above, likelihood theory interpreted as a pos-
sibilistic, and hence maxitive, measure theory simply means that addition op-
erations such as the usual Lebesgue integration are replaced by maximization
operations such as taking the supremum.
Consider first then the analogue of a marginal probability density, which we
will call a marginal possibility distribution and denote by Lp. Starting from a
‘background’ likelihood measure L(x) we ‘marginalize’ in the analogous manner
to before:
(4.1) Lp(x1) = sup{δ(x1 − projX1(x))L(x)} = sup{x|projX1 (x)=x1}
{L(x)}.
This is again simply the pushforward under the projection operator, but here
under a different type of ‘integration’ - i.e. the operation of taking a supremum.
Of course, this is just the usual profile likelihood for x1.
As above, we need not be restricted to marginal possibility distributions: we
can consider arbitrary functions of the parameter t = T (x). This leads to an
analogous pushforward operation of L(x) to Lp(t) that we denote by ⋆p:
(4.2) Lp(t) = [T ⋆p L](t) = sup{δ(t − T (x))L(x)} = sup{x|T (x)=t}{L(x)}
which again corresponds to the usual definition of profile likelihood.
5. A SIMPLE EXAMPLE COMPARING MARGINAL PROBABILITY AND
MARGINAL POSSIBILITY
Here we consider a simple example illustrating the difference between prob-
abilistic and possibilistic reasoning, in particular under marginalization/non-1-1
changes of variable.
Suppose you have three suspects in a crime. Through some means or another
you decide on the following ‘plausibility’ distribution, where plausibility is used
here as a general umbrella term for probability and/or possibility reasoning: sus-
pect one has plausibility 0.4, while the other two suspects each have plausibility
0.3. You also know that suspect one was wearing a red hat at the time of the
crime while the other two were wearing blue hats.
According to the above, under a probabilistic interpretation, the most probable
perpetrator is suspect one (who wore a red hat); but the most probable hat color
of the perpetrator is blue (with probability 0.3 + 0.3 = 0.6). This is a consequence
of the additivity of probability theory and the non-1-1 change of variables in going
from suspects to hat colors.
On the other hand, if you interpret the given plausibility numbers as a possibil-
ity distribution, then according to standard possibility theory the most possible
suspect is suspect one and the most possible hat colour is now red, i.e. is the hat
color of the most possible suspect, suspect one. Similarly, this is a consequence
of the maxitivity of possibility theory.
The difference can be made more extreme given a large number of ‘other’
suspects, each with low plausibility but sharing some common property that
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the main suspect lacks. Again, these results are a simple consequence of how
additivity and maxitivity, respectively, interact with non-1-1 changes of variable
(here: person to hat color).
We believe that there are reasonable situations where additivity is desirable,
but also reasonable situations in which maxitivity might be preferred. This is
a subject worth further debate. We note, however, that a relative probability
approach to the problem of statistical evidence, such as that presented in Evans
(2015) comes to similar conclusions to that of a possibility approach (Michael
Evans, personal communication).
6. STRENGTH OF EVIDENCE, DISTANCES AND ‘TROPICAL BAYES’
As noted in Evans (2015), it is perhaps less controversial to hold that likeli-
hood gives a qualitatively reasonable relative ordering of preference for parameter
values in light of data than it is to hold (e.g. Royall, 1997) that it provides a quan-
titative measure of relative support.
To make some progress towards addressing this distinction, we consider how to
define a suitable notion of distance that respects - but is distinct from - a given
qualitative ordering. Notions of statistical distance are common in the statistical
literature (see e.g. Basu, Shioya and Park, 2011, and references therein); here,
however, we follow the ideas developed by Tarantola (2006) of quality spaces and
distances defined in these. This leads naturally to the idea of pure likelihood
theory as a form of what we propose to call ‘Tropical Bayes’, where the meaning
of this term is discussed below.
In particular, given the ordering induced by a likelihood function (and/or
profile likelihood function):
(6.1) θ1 is preferred to θ2 iff L(θ1) > L(θ2),
we can define a likelihood distance via
(6.2) DL(θ1, θ2) = | log
L(θ2)
L(θ1)
| = | log
L(θ1)
L(θ2)
|.
This distance has the properties of being symmetric, additive and zero iff
L(θ1) = L(θ2). Tarantola (2006) argues that this notion of distance is widely
applicable for many types of qualitative orderings. In the present case it is, of
course, just the well-known log-likelihood ratio function. We propose then that,
accepting that the likelihood gives a natural qualitative preference or plausibil-
ity ordering, the log-likelihood then gives a natural distance in this ‘qualitative
space’. There remains, however, a choice of logarithm base and/or a choice of
arbitrary distance scale factor; thus we can’t fully remove some of the ‘quali-
tative’ features associated with pure likelihood theory without a further choice
of reference. One natural choice might be to take the minimum distance to a
fully saturated model, i.e. one which can fit the data perfectly, in which case one
would be interested in how much ‘fit’ to trade-off against parsimony considera-
tions (Edwards, 1992).
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Interestingly, the combination of replacing addition operations by maximiza-
tion and then working in log-space (wherein multiplication becomes addition) cor-
responds to completing the ‘tropicalization’ of probability theory: moving from
an algebraic structure in terms of (+,×) to one in terms of (max,+). This is
the subject of ‘tropical algebra’, which also goes by the name ‘max-plus’ alge-
bra, and is a popular special instance of idempotent mathematics with applica-
tions to decision theory, uncertainty quantification, statistical inference and op-
timization (see e.g. Speyer and Sturmfels, 2009; Akian, Quadrat and Viot, 1996;
Litvinov, 2007; Pachter and Sturmfels, 2004; Bernhard, 2000, for some relevant
starting points in this area). A natural interpretation of negative log-likelihood
functions in this context is as ‘cost measures’; these have also been termed
‘Maslov measures’, due to their origins in Maslov’s idempotent probability theory
(Akian, Quadrat and Viot, 1996; Bernhard, 2000). These analogies are explored
in detail by Akian, Quadrat and Viot (1996), where the natural analogue of a
random variable is a decision variable, the analogue of a Markov chain is a Bell-
man chain (i.e. the Bellman equation from the subject of dynamic programming)
and so on.
Finally, however, we note that even if profile likelihood is accepted as the
natural analogue of marginal probability, the evidential interpretation of profile
likelihood may still have difficulties; this is discussed further below.
7. DISCUSSION
7.1 Objections to profile likelihood
As discussed, it is frequently asserted that profile likelihood is not a true like-
lihood (Aitkin, 2005; Royall, 1997; Pawitan, 2001; Rohde, 2014; Evans, 2015).
Common reasons include: that it is obtained from a likelihood via maximiza-
tion (Aitkin, 2005), that it is not based directly on observable quantities (Royall,
1997; Pawitan, 2001; Rohde, 2014) and that it lacks particular repeated sampling
properties (Royall, 1997; Cox and Barndorff-Nielsen, 1994).
None of the above objections appear to the present author to apply to the
following: given a starting or ‘background’ likelihood function, profile likelihood
satisfies the axioms of possibility theory, in which the basic additivity axiom of
probability theory is replaced by a maxitivity axiom. Profile likelihood is simply
the natural possibilistic counterpart to marginal probability, where additive inte-
gration is replaced by a maxitive analogue. We thus argue that, if marginal prob-
ability is a ‘true’ probability, then profile likelihood should likewise be considered
a ‘true’ likelihood, at least when likelihood theory is interpreted in a possibilistic
manner. Negative log-likelihood functions can then be naturally interpreted as
cost measures in the sense of tropical mathematics.
7.2 Fixed data
Regarding the second two objections mentioned above: observable quantities
and repeated sampling properties, it is important to note that the given data
must be held fixed to give a consistent background likelihood over which to pro-
file. Given fixed data one has a fixed possibility measure and thus can consider
‘marginal’ - i.e. profile - likelihoods. In contrast, repeated sampling will produce a
distribution of such possibility measures, and these may or may not have good fre-
quentist properties. None of this is in contrast to marginal probability: changing
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the distribution over which we marginalize changes the resulting marginal prob-
ability. Of course, despite this caveat, profile likelihood often does have good re-
peated sampling properties (Royall, 1997; Cox and Barndorff-Nielsen, 1994) and
also plays a key role in frequentist theory, though we do not discuss this further
here. One consequence is that our conception of profile likelihood does not gen-
erally satisfy properties such as zero expectation of the associated score function
(Cox and Barndorff-Nielsen, 1994; Pawitan, 2001). These are, however, properties
dependent on particular repeated sampling notions such as ‘unbiasedness’, and
hence more properly considered as frequentist concepts. The present approach
is more suitable for those seeking a non-probabilistic ‘plausibility’ measure, as
induced by data that are considered fixed once observed.
7.3 Why?
A natural question, perhaps, is why worry about whether profile likelihood
is a true likelihood? One answer is that profile likelihood is a widely used tool
but is often dismissed as ‘ad-hoc’ or lacking proper justification. This gives the
impression that, for example, likelihood theory is lacking in comparison with e.g.
Bayesian theory in terms of systematic methods for dealing with nuisance pa-
rameters. By understanding that profile likelihood does in fact have a systematic
basis in terms of possibility theory practitioners and students can better under-
stand and reason about a widely popular and useful tool. Understanding the
connection to possibilistic as opposed to probabilistic reasoning may also help
explain why profile likelihood has emerged as a particularly promising method of
identifiability analysis (Raue et al., 2009), where identifiability is traditionally a
prerequisite for probabilistic analysis. Of course, as indicated, the price of accept-
ing profile likelihood as a ‘true’ likelihood is an interpretation in terms of pure
likelihood theory, and this makes the connections to repeated sampling properties
more complicated. We see no need however, to restrict oneself to one perspec-
tive on statistical inference - the present possibilistic view can complement other
approaches such as frequentist statistics or Bayesian statistics. Furthermore, this
analogy opens strong connections between likelihood theory and the optimization
literature; the foundations of such connections have already been explored by e.g.
Akian, Quadrat and Viot (1996); Bernhard (2000) and provide a natural link to
pure likelihood decision theory as developed by Cattaneo (2013).
7.4 Ignorance
The possibilistic interpretation of likelihood also helps understand the rep-
resentation of ignorance. While probabilistic ignorance is not preserved under
arbitrary changes of variables (e.g. non-1-1 transformations), even in the discrete
case, possibilistic ignorance is in the following sense: if we take the maximum
likelihood over a set of possibilities, such as {x | T (x) = t} for each t, rather than
summing them, a flat ‘prior likelihood’ (Edwards, 1969, 1992) over x becomes
a flat prior likelihood over t. On the other hand, a flat prior probability over
x in general becomes non-flat over t under non-1-1 changes of variable. Thus a
profile prior likelihood has what, in many cases, may be desirable properties as a
representation of prior ignorance (see the discussion in Edwards, 1969, 1992, for
more on likelihood and the representation of ignorance). This difference in trans-
formation properties was also illustrated in our simple example comparing the
probabilistic and possibilistic analysis of criminal evidence. As noted there, how-
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ever, the relative probabilistic approach a la Evans (2015), reaches conclusions
closer to the possibilistic analysis, compared to the conclusions of the ‘absolute’
probabilistic analysis (Michael Evans, personal communication).
7.5 Point function or set function?
Likelihood is traditionally considered a point function as opposed to a set
function; this is also related to controversy over defining likelihood functions for
so-called composite hypotheses (see e.g. Edwards, 1992; Royall, 1997). Authors
such as Basu (2012) have argued, contra e.g. Fisher, that likelihood could be
directly extended to a set function. Basu (2012) further developed the argument
that this set function could be taken as additive - we are more inclined, here at
least, to consider the first possibility, and reject the second. A number of other
authors have also considered the question of composite hypotheses, in particular
in the context of defining evidence (see e.g. Zhang and Zhang, 2013; Blume, 2013;
Bickel, 2012).
We have attempted to avoid the issue of set functions/composite hypotheses
somewhat by instead using the concept of a non-1-1 transformation of variables.
This allows us to consider the likelihood of subsets of the full/background pa-
rameter space based on an indexing statistic, i.e. by using subsets defined via
{x | T (x) = t}. This approach is based on what amounts to equality constraints,
leaving out subsets defined via inequality constraints. It may be desirable to fur-
ther relax this and simply consider likelihood directly as a set function defined
via
(7.1) Lp(A) = supx∈A{L(x)}
for A ⊆ X. This allows for inequality constraints such as those in A =
{x | T (x) ≤ t}.
We leave consideration of this approach to future work. Presumably, however,
one could recover the present approach by considering some notion of minimal
and/or extremal sets of equality constraints, e.g. by restricting attention to those
inequality constraints that are active during the profiling/maximization proce-
dure, and hence those that are reduced to binding equality constraints. The in-
terpretation of negative log-likelihoods as cost measures may also be helpful here.
7.6 Evidence
One of the key issues to consider when deciding whether to accept profile like-
lihoods as ‘true’ likelihoods is whether they can play the same role that ‘full’ like-
lihoods play in defining evidential measures (Royall, 1997; Aitkin, 2010; Evans,
2015; Zhang and Zhang, 2013; Blume, 2013; Bickel, 2012). Mathematically, it ap-
pears clear that profile likelihood is entirely analogous to marginal probability;
it is less clear whether - or under what circumstances - one should use marginal
(whether maxitive or additive) measures in defining evidence. We believe that
this applies equally to the Bayesian approach. A way forward from here would be
to separate the questions: first accept profile likelihood as a ‘marginal’ possibil-
ity measure, and then investigate under what circumstances marginal measures
can be given further evidential interpretations. We suspect that the answer may
require additional concepts and/or assumptions like those used in the causal infer-
ence literature to separate spurious marginal associations from ‘true’ causation
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(Pearl, 2009a,b). That is, we suspect that ‘evidence’ may be better defined in
causal terms than in either purely probabilistic or purely possibilistic terms. As
such, the question of whether or not profile likelihood is a ‘true’ likelihood should
be independent of whether it plays the role of an evidential measure, unless the
definition of likelihood is itself explicitly supplemented with causal assumptions.
8. CONCLUSIONS
We have argued that profile likelihood has as much claim to being a true likeli-
hood as a marginal probability has to being a true probability distribution. In the
case of marginal probability, integration over variables takes probability distri-
butions to probability distributions, while in the case of likelihood, maximization
takes likelihood functions to likelihood functions. Maximization can be considered
in this context as an alternative (idempotent) notion of integration, and a like-
lihood function as a maxitive possibility measure. There are some conflicts with
both Bayesian and frequentist considerations, however: lack of additivity and lack
of some repeated sampling properties, respectively. In our view, these conflicts are
not necessarily an issue, as neither additivity nor repeated sampling properties
such as unbiasedness are beyond objections. Instead we argue that the present ap-
proach gives a self-consistent theory suitable for possibilistic statistical analysis,
with a well-defined method of treating nuisance parameters, and which continues
in the tradition of ‘pure’ likelihood theories. The connection of profile likelihoods
to evidential interpretations appears subtle (as is, we believe, the connection of
marginal probabilities to evidence); our view is that this issue should be explored
further in the context of formulating additional causal properties that an evidence
measure should satisfy, such as those required to classify marginal correlations
into ‘spurious’ and ‘true’ causal relationships. Finally, taking profile likelihood
seriously as a ‘true’ likelihood leads naturally to the idea of ‘Tropical Bayesian
Inference’, a subject yet to be properly explored by the statistical community.
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